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Abstract
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rather than phasing out their defined benefit programs – at least for now
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Chapter 10
Multiemployer Pension Plans Respond
to the Financial Crisis
Judith F. Mazo and Eli Greenblum

Multiemployer pension plans cover workers under collective bargaining
agreements including one or more unions and at least two employers.
Negotiated employer contributions to stand-alone trust funds are managed
by boards of trustees, on which employers and employees are equally
represented; almost all multiemployer plans are subject to the Taft-Hartley
Act as well as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). These plans are distinctive both in terms
of their administrative logistics and the extent to which covered employee
preferences influence plan design and operations. This chapter offers a
description of the plans themselves and the rules governing their
financing. Next, we analyze the impact of the financial crisis on a subset
of multiemployer plans—the 400+ plans whose actuarial valuations are
handled by the Segal Company—with special focus on a subset of 107
plans classified as being in critical funding status for the 2010 plan year
that had adopted rehabilitation plans by the time of the study.
We show that the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), as supplemented by temporary relief legislation in 2008 and 2010, resulted in an overall
beneficial effect on these multiemployer plans and enabled most of them
to navigate to a relatively secure financial position, as determined under
the funding rules for multiemployer plans. The sacrifices made by employers and participants in these efforts suggest that multiemployer defined
pension plans continue to enjoy support from those they cover, plus their
employers’ cooperation in keeping the plans going.

Methodology
The total number of multiemployer defined benefit (DB) plans in the
United States has dropped from about 2,400 in 1980 to 1,600 in 2009, largely
due to plan mergers. Yet over the same period, the number of participants
in multiemployer plans has grown somewhat, reaching 10.4 million by 2008,
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but the demographics have also shifted dramatically. In 1980, 76 percent of
multiemployer pension participants were active workers, a share that
dropped to 45 percent by 2008, according to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC, 2010). As the largest actuarial and benefits consulting
firm in the United States working with multiemployer plans, the Segal
Company’s clients represent about 25 percent of those plans, covering
roughly 30 percent of multiemployer plan participants nationwide. The
information provided below is based on published annual surveys of plans’
funded status information as measured under PPA, completed by Segal
Company actuaries in connection with the required annual certifications,
as well as an unpublished in-depth survey of plans classified as critical for
2010.1 The Segal Company’s database covers virtually all types and sizes of
multiemployer pension plans, in all geographic areas, industries, and levels
of financial stability. The plans covered represent the broadest and most
complete picture available of this country’s multiemployer plans.2 Our
review of the data is supplemented by observations based on illustrative
experiences of assorted plans with which we work.3

What are multiemployer plans and why do they
have special rules?
The core definition of a multiemployer plan is straightforward: it is a plan
to which two or more employers are required to contribute, under one or
more collective bargaining agreements. Beyond that simple statement lie
many variations. For example, these funds may range from 50 to 100 active
workers and include two to four contributing employers in a locality to
hundreds of thousands of participants and thousands of employers covering large geographic regions. Likewise, assets may range from $15 million
to $20 billion; however, the typical size ranges from 1,000 to 5,000 participants, with assets of about $100–$500 million. In some industries, a fairly
large number of employers may contribute under one or a few collective
bargaining agreements to which they all subscribe, while in others there
may be as many labor agreements as there are contributing employers, or
even more (if companies contribute under separate agreements with
respect to separate facilities). Some plans cover metropolitan areas, cities,
or even smaller jurisdictions, while many are statewide. Beyond some very
large regional plans (e.g. the Teamsters’ Central States and Western Conference Pension Funds, the two largest multiemployer plans which
together cover people in diverse industries working from the southeastern
United States to the Pacific coast), many unions cosponsor national funds
as well as those with more targeted coverage. Predictably, the size and shape
of fund coverage reflect the size and shape of the industries in which the

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi

190

Reshaping Retirement Security

participants work and the evolution of union representation in those
industries. Most multiemployer groups have DB plans, many also have
defined contribution (DC) plans (called ‘annuity funds’), and a fairly
small subset of those include 401(k) arrangements. Many multiemployer
pension plans facing financial problems have reduced future benefit accruals, but few have completely frozen accruals.
Ordinarily, covered workers are all represented by the same local union,
or by locals affiliated with the same international union. Multiemployer
plans are found throughout the economy, notably in the construction
industry, entertainment, trucking and transportation, longshore, retail,
mining and manufacturing, food service, hospitality, health care, building
service, communications, and the garment trades. More than half of the
nation’s multiemployer funds are in the construction trades, whose funds
cover roughly 35 percent of all multiemployer-plan participants. Multiemployer pension plans are usually paired with multiemployer funds that
provide health coverage, life insurance, and other welfare-type benefits,
which are also financed through fixed employer contributions.
Understanding that there are exceptions at each general point, commonly found general characteristics of multiemployer funds have led to the
development of special rules to accommodate their special circumstances.
Most notably, virtually all multiemployer plans are set up as trusts structured under the Taft-Hartley Act, operated by joint management–labor
Boards of Trustees as stand-alone entities operationally independent of
the contributing employers and the unions that represent their participants. The Trustees, as plan sponsors, have full responsibility for managing
the assets and administering the benefits, including the duty to make sure
the plan meets all applicable legal requirements. For the great majority of
plans, they are also responsible for designing the benefit formulas.
Typically, participating employers contribute the amounts negotiated
under their bargaining agreements, say $2 for each hour that participants
work in covered service. The plan trustees, working with their professional
advisors, determine and set the benefits, while the unions and employers
independently negotiate over the flow of contributions. While the employers’ most salient obligation is to contribute as defined in their labor contracts, because the plans promise participants a fixed benefit, these are
classified as DB plans under ERISA and the IRC. Contributing employers
are often small businesses that might not provide pension or health coverage on their own. Also, employees often work for short periods before
moving on to similar jobs with different contributing employers. The
employers compete with each other and with noncontributing companies
for contracts and customers.
Without the intra-industry standardization and portable pension coverage that multiemployer plans provide, few of the participants would have
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access to a DB plan or the tenure with any one employer to earn reasonable
pensions, given their transitory employment. Consistent with minimum
standards set in ERISA and the IRC, most plans require a worker to have
1,000 hours of service with the employer sponsoring the plan during a
twelve-month period (a year of service) to be eligible for plan coverage and
vesting credit, and between 1,000 and 2,000 hours during a twelve-month
period for a full-year’s benefit credit.4 A multiemployer plan participant
may work for a single employer for 20, 50, or 150 hours during a given year,
but will earn years of vesting and accrual credit by combining the service
performed for all employers contributing to the same multiemployer plan.
Regardless of which or how many employers a participant worked for, his or
her pension is owed by the plan, backed by the industry. Contributing
employers may come and go, but whoever is obliged to contribute in a
given year will be funding a portion of the plan’s accumulated liabilities to
all of its participants over time, not just the benefits being earned by its own
workers.
Retirement benefits in a multiemployer plan are rarely based on an
employee’s pay. Rather, the pension is usually a specified dollar amount
per year of covered service (e.g. $80 per month times years of service), or a
specified percentage of the total that employers are required to contribute
based on the participant’s work (e.g. a monthly benefit equal to 2 percent
of total required contributions, so a participant with 1,500 hours of service
in a given year at a $1.00 hourly contribution rate would accrue a $30
monthly benefit). Often the benefit formula is a combination, reflecting
changes in the formula over time. For example, a plan may provide a
monthly benefit that is the sum of $28 per year of service prior to 1980,
$49 per year of service from 1980 through 2003, and 2 percent of contributions required from January 1, 2004. Some plans have a uniform benefit
formula for all participants, while others offer a variety of benefit formulas
that correspond, for example, to varying contribution rates under the
different collective bargaining agreements.
Multiemployer pension plans hardly ever pay out benefits prior to early
or normal retirement (except for death or disability), since ‘termination of
employment’ other than for retirement is not a meaningful concept in
these kinds of continuous-coverage group pension plans. Multiemployer
pension plans generally pay pensions as life annuities: few of them offer
lump-sum options, and those that do usually offer only a small portion of a
participant’s benefit as a lump sum. Retirees make up a relatively large
proportion of the participant base for many multiemployer plans in part
because the plans reserve most or all of the benefits earned for the provision of ongoing streams of retirement income.
Several pertinent points emerge from our overview. First, because multiemployer plans are the product of collective bargaining, the funding and
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other regulatory requirements must accommodate bargaining realities,
where stability in pension and other costs is paramount.5 Moreover, since
employers cannot be compelled to contribute beyond what they have
agreed to in collective bargaining, the required funding generally cannot
change during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Inasmuch as
many plans have a multitude of bargaining agreements that expire and
renew at varying times, and as the bargaining process cannot accommodate
sharp or unanticipated expense shocks, predictability in pension-funding
requirements is essential, over time, beyond the standard three- to fouryear duration of a single bargaining agreement. When the parties negotiate
pension contributions, the amounts are explicit alternatives to increases in
wages, health contributions, or other elements of compensation, so the
employees often view the contributions as ‘their money’. If they do not
believe the trade-off is worth it, they might reject the agreement, which
could throw the plan’s funding arrangements into disarray.
The fact that the plans are run for union-represented groups also means
that policymakers have not worried that these plans might be used to
maximize tax advantages for employers, especially since both the TaftHartley Act and ERISA bar employers from recovering surplus assets after
a plan termination. Moreover, the plans are egalitarian, providing essentially the same benefits for all employees with the same patterns of service
under the plan, so there is no question of discrimination in favor of the
highly paid. Due to the Taft-Hartley structure, with an independent operation run by a Board on which the employers and the employees have equal
representation, the entire cost of plan administration must be paid out of
the plan’s assets, with funds that would otherwise be dedicated to paying
benefits.
In most cases, union trustees are also union officers elected by the membership to their union position, and as politicians they are highly sensitive to
the will of the voting membership (which sometimes includes retired as well
as active workers). Trustees, in turn, are alert to the fact that the employees
and the employers can ultimately express their sentiments about how the
plan is being run, by negotiating to reduce or cut off contributions.6 Accordingly, multiemployer plan strategies tend to reflect their stakeholders’ preferences subject to the demands of governing federal law.
In our judgment, the finances of multiemployer plans are typically more
stable than those of single-employer plans sponsored by the kinds of smalland medium-sized employers because of the broader multiemployer contribution base. By definition, a multiemployer plan does not depend on the
fortunes of one company. Often when a local multiemployer plan does
begin to falter, it is merged into a larger, stronger plan covering people
represented by the same international union. On the other hand, when a
multiemployer plan actually fails, it tends to be because of the failure of
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the industry that has supported it, and the losses to participants and to the
pension guarantee system can be large because they include liabilities
accrued by the industry over time and not just by people working for the
current cadre of contributing employers.

How do funding rules address multiemployer plans?
Distinctions for multiemployer plans have been part of the ERISA minimum-funding rules and termination insurance program since the start. As
experience under ERISA has developed, the differences between the regimes governing single-employer and multiemployer plans have widened.
That history can be instructive.

1974–80: the post-ERISA years
The US IRC has long included special rules to allow multiemployer plans to
function as pools, rather than a cluster of individual employer plans, and to
rely on negotiated contribution rates for funding and deduction purposes.
Thus, among other things, IRC s. 413(b) provides that employer contributions are considered to be deductible if the amounts expected to be contributed would have been within the deduction limits. This protects the
employers if, for example, there is more covered work than anticipated,
resulting in the employers’ contributing more to the plan, in the aggregate,
than would normally be deductible.
When the pension plan termination insurance program was designed,
Congress was initially uncertain whether it was needed by or appropriate
for multiemployer plans. When ERISA was passed, no multiemployer plan
had ever terminated, and, because of their broad contribution bases, these
plans were expected to be able to cover all of the benefits they promised
without government help. Accordingly, the initial multiemployer guarantee program was an experiment: from 1974 to 1977, the PBGC had the
discretion to insure benefits under terminated multiemployer plans, and
very little financing for it ($0.50/participant annual premiums vs $1.00/
participant for single-employer plans).

Early experience
Rather soon after ERISA was passed, three multiemployer plans sought
PBGC protection. These covered milkmen in New York, milkmen in New
Jersey, and cap makers in St. Louis. This made clear that there was a role for
a government guarantee of multiemployer pensions, and although it was
rarely likely to be invoked, the aggregate pension claims could be large
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compared to claims then typical under terminating single-employer plans.
Experience during that discretionary period also disclosed one of the most
serious threats to these plans’ survival and the guarantee program: like
employers sponsoring single-employer plans, employers contributing to
multiemployer plans could be liable to the PBGC for the underfunding
of a terminated plan that PBGC took over. Accordingly, it was in an employer’s interest to leave a multiemployer plan when plan funding first showed
signs of weakening. This, of course, would aggravate the plan’s problems as
fewer and fewer employers would be left to carry the funding load. It would
also stress established labor relations, as employers had only three ways to
get out of a multiemployer plan: with the union’s agreement (which was
likely to mean an agreement to end pension coverage for that group and
substitute a DC plan), by persuading the employees to oust the union, or by
going out of business.

Early multiemployer funding reform
In 1977, Congress extended the discretionary coverage period to allow for
the in-depth study of multiemployer pension plans that had not been done
in the lead-up to the enactment of ERISA. It concluded that adapting the
PBGC guarantee program to fit multiemployer plans would be futile unless
the law also addressed the ‘last-man-standing’ psychology that was propelling employers to exit multiemployer plans or press for their termination.
Ultimately, the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
(MPPAA) introduced the concept of withdrawal liability. Complex and
controversial, this law generally imposes liability on an employer that withdraws from a multiemployer plan for a pro rata share of the plan’s underfunding. The more underfunded the plan is when the employer leaves, the
higher its withdrawal liability is likely to be.
Withdrawal liability created a major incentive for employers to push to
get their multiemployer plans well funded and to keep them there. MPPAA
also revamped the pension guarantee program for those plans, making the
PBGC the financier of very last resort. Instead of guaranteeing unfunded
benefits when a multiemployer plan terminates, the PBGC does not step in
with financial support until the plan becomes insolvent and lacks cash to
pay currently due benefits at the guaranteed level. Just about all multiemployer plans terminate when there are no employers left to contribute,
because all of them have either gone out of business or otherwise are no
longer obligated to contribute to the plan.7 When that happens, plan
Trustees continue to administer the plan, collecting withdrawal liabilities,
managing assets, and paying benefits, until the funds are used up. That is
the point at which the plan can draw on PBGC for financial assistance.
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The multiemployer benefit guarantees themselves were also redefined
and reset at a low level. Initially, this was a maximum of $234/year per year
of service, or an annual pension of $7,020 for a retiree who had worked
under the plan for thirty years. This was not indexed for inflation. Congress
has increased the guarantee level once, in 1999, and today the maximum is
$429/year for each year of service, or $12,870 a year for someone with a
thirty-year career under the plan. The other especially notable MPPAA
change was the introduction of special funding rules for multiemployer
plans nearing or at bankruptcy (IRC ss. 418–418E), which authorized
benefit reductions and required that benefit payments be cut down to
guaranteed levels. As it turns out, this plan reorganization concept hardly
ever comes into play, mainly because it focuses on plans that do not have
enough assets to cover their liabilities for current pensioners. While this
may have been a concern in 1980 shortly after the ERISA funding requirements took effect, at this point, when multiemployer plans start running
short of funds, it tends to be due to investment losses that erode the
reserves being held for future retirees.

1980–2008: the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act
While funding and guarantee programs for single-employer plans were
changed repeatedly over the next quarter-century, multiemployer rules
stayed essentially the same. The 1976 ERISA rules continued to govern
multiemployer plans’ minimum funding requirements. Following a flurry
of protest and litigation, including several trips to the US Supreme Court,
employers adapted to withdrawal liability and learned to take it into
account in business planning. Only a few small plans applied for PBGC
financial assistance and the multiemployer guarantee fund consistently
ran a surplus. During the 1990s, most plans faced the challenge of overfunding, and looked for ways to be sure the employers could take a tax
deduction for their pension contribution. The MPPAA helped establish
this period of repose. After the intensity of the 1979–80 legislative battles,
neither Congress nor the Administrations had much appetite for reigniting the withdrawal liability controversy, so multiemployer plans were
routinely exempted from whatever funding changes were enacted. But
the real reason why the MPPAA reforms seemed to work so well was that
multiemployer plans were prominent among those benefiting from the
general prosperity of the 1990s. By and large, plan investments did well,
there was plenty of work for participants, and employers made profits, so
withdrawal liability and statutory minimum funding requirements drew
little attention.
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During the 1990s, negotiated contributions generally kept rolling in to
multiemployer pension plans even when the new money was not needed
for plan funding. Some plans allowed unions and employers to negotiate
short-term ‘contribution holidays’, and in some cases the bargaining agreements redirected the flow of contributions to the health plan or the
annuity fund. But unions were typically reluctant to propose or agree to
interrupt the rhythm of continuous pension contributions because restarting them at a later date would be costly from a negotiating perspective: the
union would have to trade other benefits just to reestablish the practice of
employer contributions. Most plans were amended during that period to
increase benefits, sometimes repeatedly, in order to absorb the additional
funds and assure that employers could deduct their plan contributions.
This era of general contentment and overabundance came to an
abrupt end when the investment markets crashed in 2000–2. Mature
multiemployer plans with many retirees and declining numbers of active
participants had become highly leveraged, living off the earnings from
the very considerable reserves they had built up. When those investment
gains turned into losses, funding levels declined and withdrawal liability
flared back up, reawakening employer suspicions. The median investment performance of multiemployer plans in the Segal Advisors Multiemployer Universe was 3.5 percent in 2000, 3.4 percent in 2001, and
8.2 percent in 2002.8 Since the plans’ typical actuarial earnings assumption was 7–7.5 percent, this translated into actuarial losses ranging from
4 percent in 2000 to 15.2 percent in 2002. Some plans saw funding
deficiencies looming and turned to IRS for help under ERISA relief
provisions (mainly amortization extensions), but the agency was swamped
with funding-waiver pleas from troubled single-employer plans and those
relatively unfamiliar with the intricacies of multiemployer funding. In
fact, the IRS did not start acting on multiemployer plan relief requests
until 2005.
The Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 provided a little breathing
room for single-employer plans but not for multiemployer plans. By mid2004, most multiemployer plans seemed to be treading water well enough
to avoid the catastrophic terminations that workers and the PBGC had
faced in the airline and steel industries, so the multiemployer sector did
not command policymaker attention. Nevertheless, some plans were significantly damaged and were facing imminent minimum funding crises. In
2005, several major employers and employer associations, unions, and
multiemployer plans banded together to advocate for a substantive update
to the multiemployer funding rules that would be compatible with the
character of the plans and the industries that support them. This coalition’s work with Congress led to the development of the multiemployer
provisions of the PPA of 2006.
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2008–present: the Pension Protection Act
Enacted in the summer of 2006, the PPA funding rules took effect with the
start of the 2008 plan year. This Act made a few changes in the mechanics of
the ERISA funding standard account and related rules, which continued to
apply to multiemployer plans. New benefits and benefit increases are now
amortized over fifteen rather than thirty years, and any short-term benefit
increases must be funded as quickly as they will be paid.9 Unlike singleemployer plans, multiemployer pension plans can continue to use longterm investment return assumptions chosen by their actuaries and employ
traditional actuarial methods of smoothing changes in asset values to
temper the impact of investment market fluctuations. PPA also increased
the limits on deductible contributions, to help pension plans build reserves
without penalizing contributing employers.

Longer term perspectives: the zones
For multiemployer plans, the principal PPA innovation was to require
trustees and bargaining parties to look past the plan’s financial status as
of a given valuation date, to take a measure of where it is headed. If the
funding is projected to deteriorate to specified levels over a seven-year
horizon, the trustees must adopt a formal corrective plan with annual
monitoring and adjustments specified to stay on course. The law provides
new tools to help trustees bring plan liabilities and assets into balance.
Additional reporting to participants and employers, as well as to the government, provides extra transparency and accountability.
Specifically, the law characterizes a multiemployer plan as ‘endangered’ if
its funding percentage (ratio of assets to liabilities, both measured on an
actuarial basis) is below 80 percent, or if it is projected to have an accumulated funding deficiency in the funding standard account within seven years
(as established under the ERISA rules, with the PPA modifications noted
above). If both are true, the plan is considered ‘seriously endangered’.
‘Critical status’ indicates more serious problems: a projected funding deficiency within four or five years or pending near-term cash-flow difficulties.
Colloquially, endangered status is called the ‘yellow zone’ and critical status
is the ‘red zone’. Following the Homeland Security theme, a plan that is
neither endangered nor critical is said to be in the ‘green zone’, although
there is no official classification for a plan that looks healthy according to
these metrics.
When a plan goes into the yellow zone, contribution reductions and
benefit increases are restricted. The trustees must come up with a Funding
Improvement Plan (‘FIP’) designed to close the underfunding gap by at
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least one-third over a ten-year period (for most seriously endangered plans,
the goal is a 20 percent improvement over fifteen years). This must include
schedules of benefit changes and, if necessary, contribution increases, to be
presented to the employers and unions so they can choose a solution for
their group through collective bargaining. The FIP must be reevaluated
each year by the trustees, and adjusted if needed to stay on schedule.
A plan in the red zone must be addressed with more serious solutions.
When a plan goes into the red zone, in addition to enforcing restrictions on
reducing contributions and increasing benefits, the plan must stop paying
lump sums and similar front-loaded benefits to new retirees. Trustees must
adopt a rehabilitation plan that aims at getting the fund out of critical
status within a ten-year period. This includes offering the bargaining
parties schedules of benefit cuts and contribution increases that are calibrated to achieve this improvement, for them to select through bargaining.
To give parties a full opportunity to deal with the plan’s financial challenges
through bargaining, the law starts the funding improvement and rehabilitation periods at the beginning of the plan year following the expiration of
the bargaining agreements covering 75 percent of the active participants. As
a practical matter, this often gives plans an extra two or three years to
recover. Also, the Workers, Retirees, and Employers Relief Act of 2008
allowed multiemployer plans that were in endangered or critical status in
2009 to extend their recovery periods by three additional years.
Benefit reductions under a rehabilitation plan can include the reduction
or elimination of ‘adjustable benefits’ that are ordinarily protected from
cutback, including recent benefit increases, early retirement subsidies, and
other benefit features—but not the accrued benefit payable at normal
retirement age. Moreover, these benefit reductions are ignored when
computing withdrawal liability. For active workers, future accrual rates
cannot be cut below 1 percent of contributions unless the union and
employers negotiate a deeper reduction as part of a package that is acceptable to the trustees. Employers that contribute to a red-zone plan are
subject to a contribution surcharge (initially 5 percent, going up to 10
percent after the first plan year) until they agree to an acceptable schedule
of contributions and related benefit adjustments under the rehabilitation
plan. However, there are no penalties on employers if a red-zone plan
actually has a funding deficiency, as long as the parties are living up to
their red-zone obligations and the fund makes progress as expected under
the rehabilitation plan. The rehabilitation plan benchmarks can be revised
if it turns out that the original program was too ambitious, but the ultimate
goal remains the same: emergence from critical status by the end of the
rehabilitation period.
If the trustees determine that, after exhausting all reasonable measures,
a multiemployer plan will not be able to recover within the statutory period,
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they must adopt a recovery program that may take longer but is likely to
work. If they believe that they cannot reasonably turn the situation around
even with extra time, they must design a plan to forestall insolvency. The
statutory provision authorizing these alternative approaches is often called
the ‘safety valve’.

The PPA goes into effect
The PPA funding rules first took effect as of the start of the 2008 plan year.
The first round of zone certifications was delivered on or before March 29,
2008 deadline for multiemployer plans whose plan year coincides with the
calendar year. Results were about what had been expected (Segal, 2008,
2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). After all, the PPA was enacted
because the stock market plunge at the start of the century had knocked a
number of pension plans back on their heels. Many of the plans had
already taken action by reducing future accrual rates, recommending
contribution increases, or both. Enactment of the PPA added an additional
incentive during 2007, as some boards reined in benefits and pressed the
bargaining parties for contribution increases so that their plans could avoid
a certification of yellow or red. In the survey of plan-year 2008 results,
78 percent of the plans were ‘green’; that is, neither endangered nor
critical (Segal, 2008). That meant that, at a minimum, they were more
than 80 percent funded and were not faced with an imminent minimum
funding deficiency. Twelve percent of the plans were classified as yellow,
usually because they were on their way out of danger but had to continue
exercising contribution and benefit discipline in order to avoid going into
a troubled zone.
In that first year, fewer than 20 percent of the multiemployer plans had
funding ratios below the 80 percent funding mark. In many cases, the yellowzone plans only needed what were called ‘no-action’ FIPs. The discipline
they had imposed in the prior few years was projected to be enough to carry
them out of endangered status within the statutory time frame, without the
need for additional special action. Plans that were classified as red were
usually expecting it. After PPA was enacted, most of the plans in that initial
group had been alerted to what they were facing, and many had already
started planning for it well before the law took effect (Segal, 2008).
Plans are not allowed to reduce adjustable benefits of participants who
retire before they are given notice that their pension plan is in the red zone
and warned that benefits may be cut. Because the law was passed in 2006
and the zone rules did not take effect until 2008, plans whose financial
struggles were widely known were concerned that the advance-notice
requirement could trigger a run for the door, with participants retiring at
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their earliest opportunity to avoid possible cutbacks. Accordingly, PPA
authorized plans that believed they would be in critical status to give the
warning early. Ultimately, only a handful of plans took advantage of this
opportunity. The funds certified as critical initially were generally plans
that were overloaded with retirees and terminated vested participants,
which had been grappling with funding challenges for years. For the
2008 plan year, 10 percent of the surveyed plans were in the red zone
(Segal, 2008).

The market crashes: 2008–9
Stock values had already begun to fall in the spring of 2008, with losses
picking up speed over the summer; in late September, both the equity and
bond markets plunged and the nation’s financial system was in turmoil.
The sudden, severe drop took a heavy toll on many pension plans. Even
though multiemployer plans had funding rules that provided mechanisms
to smooth out volatility, the impact of the asset crash on plans’ zone
classification was immediate and dramatic because the asset plunge was
so severe. With typical portfolio losses in the 20–25 percent range, this
resulted in actuarial losses of roughly 25–30 percent. Bleak employment
projections used in the zone status determination process exacerbated the
decline in the number of green-zone plans.

The Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery
Act of 2008
Employers grew concerned about the pension claims on their cash flows
attributable to the combined asset drop and unfunded liability spike.
Moreover, multiemployer plan sponsors worried about the disruption to
their industries that could be triggered by the drastic cuts in benefits and
increases in contributions that the PPA rules might force them to adopt.
Benefit cuts and contribution hikes might also become unnecessarily
severe if the crisis proved to be short-lived and would be difficult to unwind
once bargaining agreements had been amended and benefit reductions
had been put into place.
Before the official start of the rehabilitation or funding improvement
period, during what the law labels the funding improvement or rehab plan
‘adoption period’, benefit increases are not allowed. During the formal
correction period, plan amendments increasing benefits are allowed only if
they are funded with new money and do not slow down the plan’s recovery
process. Also during the adoption periods, negotiated contribution rates
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cannot be reduced, directly or indirectly; this restriction continues to apply
to yellow-zone plans throughout the funding improvement period.
Congress responded to these concerns by passing the Worker, Retiree,
and Employer Recovery Act (‘WRERA’) in December of 2008. For multiemployer plans, the intent and effect of the WRERA relief provisions was to
give trustees and bargaining parties some breathing room, to take stock of
what had happened and come up with a strategy for repairing the damage.
Under WRERA, multiemployer plan trustees had additional options for the
2009 plan year.10 Regardless of their actual status in 2009, they could stay in
the zone status in which they had been classified for 2008 (the ‘freeze’). If
they were in the yellow or red zone in 2009 and chose to accept that status,
rather than to freeze at a higher 2008 level, they could add three years to
their statutory recovery periods. That meant that, instead of aiming to get
out of the red or yellow zone by, for instance, 2019, their deadline would be
2022. This might enable them to use less drastic corrective measures in the
early years. Also, if they had been in the red or yellow zone for 2008 and
they chose the freeze, they could skip the otherwise-required annual
update to their Funding Improvement or Rehabilitation Plan and wait to
adapt their remedial program until they had a clearer picture of the plan’s
and the employers’ financial situation.

Where multiemployer plans ended up
Indeed, the plan classifications did shift dramatically from 2008 to 2009. As
measured by the actuaries, the share of plans whose funded status put them
in the red zone jumped from 10 to 30 percent, while 32 percent of the plans
met the tests for endangered, or yellow-zone, status. For 2009, plans in the
green zone still represented a plurality, but their share of the total dropped
by more than half, to 38 percent (from 78 percent in 2008). These were
classifications based solely on the statutory tests for endangered and critical
status.11 For more than 150 plans (or almost half of those that had been
green in the 2008 database), the indicators of zone status had deteriorated
to the point that they dropped to yellow or even red for 2009. Yet, WRERA
gave the trustees the opportunity to freeze their 2008 status and stay in the
green zone for one more year, and 88 percent of those plans elected to do
so. As a result, the final official zone count for the 2009 plan year, taking
into account trustees’ freeze elections, was 75 percent green, 11 percent
yellow, and 14 percent red. In addition, 40 percent of the plans in the
yellow or red zone in 2009 chose to accept the offer under WRERA and take
three extra years to recover, and roughly 75 percent of the plans classified
as endangered or critical in 2008 chose the WRERA freeze for 2009, to
avoid imposing deeper benefit cuts or requests for higher contributions.
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Toward recovery
As investment markets started to rebound in 2010, the funded classification
of multiemployer pension plans generally followed suit. The zone line-up
for the 2010 plan year reflected the country’s tentative economic recovery.
When compared to the 2009 status (as determined by the actuaries
and ignoring the WRERA freezes): 53 percent green, 18 percent yellow,
29 percent red (see Table 10.1). Notably, nearly all of the improvement
from 2009 to 2010 in the share of green-zone plans seems to be due to the
recovery of plans that had been labeled endangered (yellow zone) the
prior year. By contrast, there was little change in the proportion still in
critical condition, which dropped 1 percentage point from the 30 percent
level in 2009.
We believe that this is largely due to three factors. First, since a plan can
be assigned to the yellow zone based solely on its funded percentage, it is
easier to flip into and out of endangered status due to transient events than
it is to enter and exit the red zone. This suggests that mechanical metrics do
not necessarily reveal much about a plan’s financial vigor—the extent to
which its income stream is keeping up with its benefit payment commitments, and whether that outlook is improving or declining—so the yellowzone tests can yield a fairly large proportion of false positives or false
negatives. The funded percentage used in these tests is based on the plan
asset values used by the actuary for plan funding. The asset smoothing
process (spreading out recognition of the impact of actual performance)
and the ability to switch smoothing methods also contribute to the variances between plans’ financial outlook and how they score on the yellowzone tests.
Second, the law deliberately makes it hard to get out of the red zone.
Instead of just reversing the triggers that put it into critical status, a plan
cannot emerge from the red zone unless its actuary projects that it will meet
the minimum funding standards for at least ten years. The goal was to keep
plans from bouncing into and out of the red zone and having to start
and stop the rehabilitation process repeatedly. And the third factor

Table 10.1 Breakdown of multiemployer plans by certified zone status by
percentage of plans in each: 2008–10 zone
Zone
Red zone
Yellow zone
Green zone

2008

2009

2010

9
11
80

30
32
38

29
18
53

Source : Authors’ computations from Segal (2008–2011a, 2011b, 2011c); see text.
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distinguishing the red zone is more important: in addition to other negative financial indicators, by definition, plans in the red zone are facing
either a funding deficiency or insolvency within the next ten years. This is
about more than fluctuations in asset values that can put a plan’s funded
ratio a few percentage points on one side or the other of a fixed cutoff
point. The economic disruption of 2008 had abiding consequences for
many of the industries supporting multiemployer plans, beyond driving
down plan assets. Of greater concern has been the relentless recession and
corresponding plunge in the availability of work for so many multiemployer plan participants, especially in the construction industry.
When employers have enough business, they hire covered workers and
contribute to their pension plans based on measures of covered work as set
out in their bargaining agreements (usually on a per work-hour or workweek basis). As covered hours have fallen substantially, however, year-toyear improvements in the plans’ equity portfolios may not be sufficient to
propel troubled plans back to financial health. For example, since 2008,
some multiemployer plans have reported employment declines of 30 percent or more, especially in the construction industry, which represents
roughly half of the plans. This feeds back into the zone certification via
the trustees’ projections of future industry activity, which the actuary looks
to in projecting the possibility of a funding deficiency or insolvency in the
coming years. Regardless of the performance of plan assets, in a number of
instances, trustees are projecting a slow recovery to pre-2008 levels, if they
expect an industry recovery at all.

Multiemployer plans in critical status
for the 2010 plan year
Of the 373 multiemployer plans for which 2010 financial and zone-related
data had been tabulated as of the date of this writing, 107 critical status
plans had formally adopted rehabilitation plans by the end of that year.
The principal purpose of the special multiemployer PPA rules was to
identify struggling plans, give their sponsors tools and flexibility to fix
them, and make them responsible for doing so. Here, we look at how the
rules are working for this subgroup of multiemployer plans.

Plan characteristics
Like the universe of surveyed plans, these red-zone plans are distributed
throughout the country, range in size from very small to very large, and
cover people working in a broad range of industries (Tables 10.2 and 10.3).
Of these, 21 percent had been in critical status in 2008 when PPA went into
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Table 10.2 Geographical and industry distribution of redzone and bright-red-zone multiemployer plans in 2010
No. of multiemployer plans
Red zone

Bright red zone

Region
New England
Midwest
New York
West
Mid-Atlantic
South
Total

10
26
28
22
12
9
107

10
15
18
11
7
6
67

Industry
Construction
Entertainment
Manufacturing
Printing
Retail
Services
Transport
Other
Total

48
3
8
9
7
10
21
1
107

41
3
1
5
9
7
1
67

Source : Authors’ computations from Segal (2010); see text.

effect, and 63 percent were in fact in the green zone for that year. For sixtytwo of the plans, 2010 was the first year that their status was officially red.
This was generally because they took the WRERA option to retain their
2008 green or yellow zone status for 2009. Two-thirds of these otherwise
red-zone plans elected the freeze. Moreover, a few were surprisingly well
funded, including one that was more than 100 percent funded
(Table 10.3). This is another example of the shortcomings of using the
ratio of assets to liabilities as of a given date as an indicator of plan strength.

Red-zone plans
While the law identifies a subcategory of endangered plans deemed to have
multiple problems but not yet in the critical category, labeling them ‘seriously endangered’ (colloquially, ‘deep yellow’ or ‘orange’), and subjects
them to somewhat different requirements,12 there is no such formal ranking among critical status plans. In fact, there is some sorting among those
in the red zone, as the trustees make decisions about fashioning a rehabilitation plan, which is due roughly eight months after a plan’s initial certification as critical. The de facto subcategories are plans that believe they can
recover within the specified time frame (called here ‘bright red’); plans
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Table 10.3 Funded percentage distribution of red-zone
and bright-red-zone multiemployer plans in 2010
Funded %*

20–30
30–40
40–50
50–60
60–70
70–80
80–90
90–100
100–110
Total

No. of multiemployer plans
Red zone

Bright red zone

1
0
6
13
30
38
15
3
1
107

0
0
5
6
17
24
11
3
1
67

Note : *Assets as % of accrued benefits.
Source : Authors’ computations from Segal (2010); see text.

that expect to emerge from red over a somewhat longer period (‘dark
red’); and those (‘rusty red’) plans that have basically given up and are
focused on forestalling insolvency, which is the minimum required by
PPA’06. The statutory provision directing trustees of red-zone plans to
pursue alternative goals if they determine that, after ‘exhausting all reasonable measures’, their plans could not recover within the standard time
frame—or at all—is referred to as ‘the safety valve’. Of the red-zone plans
described here, roughly 63 percent have created rehabilitation plans that,
in the view of the trustees and bargaining parties, should enable the plans
to exit the red zone by or before the end of the standard ten-year (or
thirteen-year, if that option was chosen under WRERA) rehabilitation
period. Four of these have the so-called ‘do-nothing’ rehabilitation plans;
that is, no additional contribution increases or benefit reductions are
needed, beyond what was already agreed to in the bargaining agreements
before the plans went into critical status, to carry them out of the red zone.
Many critical-status plans that are aiming to recover try to get thoroughly
out of red and into the green zone, because advancing just to endangered
status—the yellow zone—means they would have to recapitulate the whole
process of notices, formal planning, and monitoring, and they would have
even less flexibility in managing their plan benefits and contribution rates
than they do in critical status. Also, they are required under PPA to develop
a decent margin of protection from slipping back into red in the near
future, and they usually want to do whatever they can to avoid a restart of
the red-zone ordeal in case there is another reversal of the fortunes of the
plan or the industry. Like the critical status plans generally, the plans on
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track to get out of the red zone within the standard twelve to fifteen years
do not fit any particular profile in terms of size, industry, or geographic
area. As Tables 10.2 and 10.3 indicate, there is a surprising variety in
their funded percentages, which range from 40 to 108 percent, averaging
71 percent. Fifteen of these plans were funded at 80 percent or better.
Virtually all of the plans in this group that were eligible to do so chose to
add the extra three years to their rehabilitation periods. Excluding the four
‘do-nothing’ plans, 85 percent offered the bargaining parties at least one
optional package of benefit reductions and contribution increases in addition to the mandatory default schedule, which emphasizes benefit reductions. In most cases (63 percent), the choice was between the default
schedule and one preferred option. Some offered two or even three alternatives to the default, and one rehabilitation plan had as many as fourteen
options from which the parties could select in bargaining. Particularly with
plans maintained under a small number of bargaining agreements, positions taken by the employer and union representatives on the boards of
trustees can be a good preview of the reactions of the bargaining parties.
The expectation is that the parties will elect the preferred option, which
may have been informally pre-negotiated before the trustees officially
settled on schedules. In the more typical situation, trustee-level discussions
supported by actuarial modeling can address questions from the employer
and union perspectives so that less time is needed for the official collectivebargaining process. This phenomenon also appears where there may be
numerous contracts but a few dominant employers or employer associations. Prompt adoption of an acceptable schedule enables the employers to
avoid or minimize the contribution surcharges that go into effect roughly
shortly after a plan’s red-zone status is certified.
In considering the interaction of trustee decision-making and collective
bargaining, it is worth recalling that plan trustees and bargaining parties
are often the same people wearing different hats. The fact that, as trustees,
they reach decisions that are designed to be acceptable to both sides in
their labor-relations capacity is the rationale for the ‘two-hat’ concept
under ERISA and the Taft-Hartley Act. Plans would soon fail if their
trustees had to ignore the practical effects of plan benefits and costs on
the employers and workers whose support is necessary to keep the plans
going. The standard approach is for the trustees to work their way to a few
consensus solutions. In many industries, the default plan may be too
extreme to be acceptable to either side, but it put together at the end of
the process because the law requires that it be offered. Sometimes the
parties take special steps to make the default plan especially unappealing,
with deep benefit cuts and a sharp first-year contribution increase, in order
to assure widespread agreement on the preferred schedule. For example,
in one case, contributions were required to increase in the first year by
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23 percent under the preferred schedule but 186 percent under the
default. The differential was due in part to the fact that the default required
the full increase to go into effect the first year, while the preferred allowed
it to be phased in over a number of bargaining cycles. (All of the groups
bargaining with regard to that plan accepted the preferred schedule.)
If a plan’s funded positions and the industry’s financial positions were
static, phased-in contribution increases would end up with a higher eventual rate, as compared to an earlier but higher increase—like paying the
same dollar amount of debt in long-term or short-term installments. But, of
course, these real-life circumstances will vary from time to time and the
bright-red plans, by definition, are expected to recover—perhaps before
the higher contribution rates would fully phase in.
The rehabilitation plans that these boards of trustees designed (again,
other than the ‘no-action’ ones) ‘mix-and-match’ contribution increases
and benefit reductions in a wide variety of combinations, corresponding to
the wide variety of circumstances in which the different plans must make
their way back to financial stability. The preferred schedules called for
contribution increases in the first year ranging from 4.4 to 97 percent,
averaging 23 percent, but most of the increases are clustered in the 6–15
percent range. All of the preferred schedules for these plans cut adjustable
benefits—primarily early retirement subsidies—for the then-current active
participants and all future retirees. In addition, roughly 30 percent of the
bright-red plans would reduce future accrual rates as part of the preferred
schedules under their rehabilitation plans. These benefit reductions
ranged from 7 to 75 percent, with a high degree of variation.
Reductions in future benefit accrual rates are more common among
multiemployer plans wrestling with funding issues than these figures
show, since this type of benefit cut is often made outside of the rehabilitation plan. In the four years before going into critical status, one-third of the
bright-red plans had cut future accrual rates, either directly or by a plan
amendment, excluding recent contribution increases from the benefit
formula.
The default schedules for these plans also displayed wide variation. Only
28 percent of the default schedules called for no initial increase in contribution rates, because—as required by PPA—the remedial plan could be
fashioned solely based on benefit reductions. For the other bright-red
plans, the initial year default contribution rate increases for bright-red
plans ranged from 1 to 186 percent, with an average increase of 37 percent
(the ‘interquartile range’ was 10–50 percent, meaning half of the plans
required a default increase in that range, while one-quarter each were
above and below).
For some 30 percent of the bright-red-zone plans, the default schedule
required a higher contribution rate increase than the preferred alternative,
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for the reasons discussed above. For four of them, the preferred schedule
cut future accruals more deeply than the default schedule. That may have
been due to the 1 percent floor on permitted default-schedule reductions
in future accrual rates. Thirteen of the sixty-seven bright-red plans, including all those with ‘do-nothing’ rehabilitation plans, offered only one
schedule, the default. Four of those plans aim to repair their funding
positions without contribution rate increases, relying instead on reductions in adjustable benefits and future accrual rates. Three of these plans
offer only the default schedule, both to preserve their tradition of
providing a uniform benefit formula for all participants (a strong incentive for many plans, both to maintain equity among bargaining groups
and to simplify administration, especially where employees move from
employer to employer) and to avoid provoking influential employers who
have expressed opposition to the DB format.

‘Dark-red’ plans: safety-value plans with extended red-zone exit goals
Twelve of the plans in the sample—about 11 percent of those in critical
status for 2010—have determined that, even after ‘exhausting all reasonable measures’, they could not emerge from that status within the time
allotted by the statute. Rather than forcing the plan into the standard mold
to the point that, in their trustees’ judgment, their plans or industries
would be severely damaged, those plans have set a longer-range goal for
their rehabilitation. Seven of them have set target emergence dates in
14–19 years, two in 21–28 years, and three in 30 or more years. Seven of
these dark-red plans are in the transportation industry, three in construction, and two in retail trade. One is quite small, with only $6 million in
assets; four are fairly small, with $23–$77 million in assets; and the remaining seven are standard size for local/regional multiemployer plans, with
assets ranging from $133 to $272 million. On average, their funding ratio as
measured for this purpose is 67 percent, with the actual percentages
running from 56 to 78 percent. All have adopted rehabilitation plans that
call for a combination of benefit reductions, including adjustable benefit
cuts for active and retiring participants, and contribution rate increases.
One of these plans offers only the default schedule, nine offer the default
plus one option, and two of the plans offer two alternatives to the default.
For two of the plans, the default schedule calls for a significantly higher
initial contribution rate increase than the alternatives, while in six plans the
initial default and preferred schedule contribution increases are the same
or fairly close (within 1 percentage point). In six cases, the rehabilitation
plan does not call for cuts in future accruals, either under the default or the
preferred schedule. In the others, the accrual-rate cuts are either the same
or deeper under the default schedule.
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‘Rusty-red’ plans: critical plans aiming to forestall insolvency
Finally, there is a cluster of plans whose trustees—unquestionably in consultation with bargaining parties—have concluded that there is no way
their plans could recover, at least without demanding unreasonable sacrifices from the parties, which they believe would probably hasten the plans’
failure. These rusty-red plans are stretching to try to forestall eventual
insolvency, which would force a reduction in benefit payments to PBGCguaranteed levels. There are twenty-eight such plans (26 percent of all of
the rehabilitation plans in the sample) in a range of industries, most of
which are dying or severely impaired, at least in the regions where the
plans operate. These include eight in the printing/newspaper industries,
seven in transportation, five in manufacturing, only four in construction,
three in entertainment (two of which cover people working in local movie
theaters), and one in services. Only two expect to become insolvent within
five years, another five before ten years, seventeen more within twenty years,
and the remaining four expect that it will be thirty or more years until
they run out of funds to pay benefits. At least one plan has set up its
rehabilitation program to theoretically—and just barely—avoid ever running out of money.
These plans have undertaken several changes in their structure of late.
All but one imposed adjustable benefit cuts; eight have preferred schedules
that severely cut the benefit accrual rate (by at least 20 percent), while
eleven others had already slashed benefits prior to the rehab process. The
average first-year contribution rate increase is 21 percent in the default
schedule, and 19 percent in the preferred, but this is heavily influenced by
a few outliers. For the majority, these increases are in the 10–17 percent
range. For those that apply these increases on a compounded basis over
several years (as is generally the case in the preferred schedule when
emergence is planned), this can amount to enormous increases over
time. For example, if the rehabilitation plan schedule calls for a 10 percent
contribution-rate increase every year during the rehabilitation period, a
bargaining agreement calling for a $2 hourly contribution rate for 2010
would have to be renegotiated to provide for a $3.22 rate by 2015, and
ultimately a contribution of $5.19 per hour starting in 2020. The average
funding ratio is 67 percent, and only two were below 50 percent for 2010.
Four have a funding ratio above 80 percent. As to asset size, four have less
than $10 million remaining, twelve others have less than $80 million, eight
more have between $80 and $400 million, and four had at least $600
million at the beginning of the 2010 Plan Year.
Whether all of these plans will inevitably proceed to fail is an open
question. It is possible that some may recover with an industry turnaround,
or that the more viable groups will be spun off and merged with plans in
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their industry whose prospects are better. Others may find that a mass
withdrawal is more affordable for their participants and employers than a
slow and hopeless decline. Currently, there is a gap in the law between the
MPPAA plan reorganization/insolvency rules and the PPA zone rules. For
plans that are drifting into insolvency, with or without a mass withdrawal
along the way, statutory amendments are needed to make the processes
work together seamlessly. In the course of reexamining the end-of-life rules
for multiemployer plans, Congress may also consider updating the level of
the multiemployer benefit guarantees, as some multiemployer advocates
have requested.13
A mass withdrawal typically requires union cooperation, unless all of the
employers are going out of business. Negotiated withdrawals usually
include a replacement retirement plan of some kind. This may be a DC
plan but, if the employer has a very well funded single-employer plan for
the rest of its workforce, might include coverage under that plan. So the
decision on a mass withdrawal is likely to be a mutual one, with both parties
weighing the ultimate costs they would face. On the other hand, in some
situations a plan that is on the ropes might have a chance at resurrection.
While the rapid recovery hopes of a few construction funds in the Chicago
area were dashed when the city lost its bid for the 2016 Olympics, the
announcement of a different large-scale project—say, the licensing of a
nuclear power plant or building of the long-awaited third regional airport—could have the opposite effect.

Coda: funding relief and 2011 funded status results
Following up on WRERA, in late June of 2010, Congress passed the Pension
Relief Act (‘PRA’),14 which (among other things) softened the recovery
burden for multiemployer plans with reasonable expectations of moving
into the green zone and stabilizing their ongoing funding status. It gave
plans the option to amortize the 2008–9 asset losses over twenty-nine rather
than fifteen years15 and to extend the smoothing period over which those
losses are recognized in their actuarial value of assets. A plan is not eligible
to use these tools unless it is projected to be solvent over the period that the
relief would be in effect, based on contribution levels already bargained, so
few of the ‘safety-valve’ red-zone plans are likely to qualify. For other plans,
the relief will enable them to improve their zone status or to impose less
drastic recovery measures because it will not be as difficult to avoid a
funding deficiency. Still other plans hope to use the relief as an opportunity
to stabilize their finances, by adding margins to absorb adverse future
experience (Table 10.4).
Depending on the situation, in practical terms, this could permit a plan
to avoid the need for additional remedial actions, to preclude a plan from
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Table 10.4 Average funded percentage and market value of assets of red-zone and
bright-red-zone multiemployer plans in 2010
Zone
Bright red (67)
Dark red (12)
Rusty red (28)
All plans in
rehabilitation (107)

Average funded %

Average market value of assets ($m)

71
67
67
70

467
132
190
357

Source : Authors’ computations from Segal (2010); see text.

dropping back into the yellow or red zones and starting the rehabilitation
process all over again, or, for plans that have always been green, to
strengthen their buffer against endangered or critical status. At this
point, it is too early to analyze the effect of that funding relief on the
plans and on their zone status. The initial phase of the 2011 Segal survey
covers 234 calendar-year multiemployer plans, for which 2011 zone certifications were completed by March 31. Of these, 66 percent (154 plans)
elected some or all of the PRA funding relief. Coupled with continued
favorable investment results, the plans appear to be continuing their climb
back to a more comfortable financial status. Sixty-five percent of them are
now in the green zone, 11 percent are in the yellow zone, and the share in
the red zone has dropped to 24 percent (Segal, 2011c).

Conclusion
The PPA of 2006 challenges the trustees, employers, and unions that
manage and fund multiemployer pension plans to look at their plans’
finances—not just as of the start of each year but also over a longer
period, to project where the plans are headed. If the intermediate outlook does not look good, the parties must act to correct the trajectory
based on metrics prescribed in ERISA and the IRC. PPA also gave trustees
and bargaining parties flexibility to accomplish this, including the
authority to cut early retirement subsidies and other protected benefits
in order to bring plan assets and liabilities into a better balance. PPA
provides a structure that enables trustees to devise plan remedies that fit
within the industry- and labor-relations framework on which the plan
depends. Shortly after the provisions became effective, the financial crisis
forced trustees and bargaining parties for most plans to confront this
challenge in a meaningful way.
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The experience of the multiemployer plans analyzed here indicates that
PPA is doing the job for which it was designed, for those plans. Even in the
face of the dramatic investment losses experienced in 2008–9, followed by
the depressed level of employment in the construction and other industries
where multiemployer plans are prevalent, a large majority of the plans
appears to be succeeding. This might not have been possible under PPA
as enacted, and it appears that the temporary extra help that Congress
provided in WRERA and the PRA was essential. Nevertheless, one in four of
the red-zone plans—between 5 and 10 percent of all multiemployer
plans—has concluded that it is unlikely to recover, a conclusion that many
would probably not yet have reached if PPA had not spurred them to confront
their futures. It is possible that having the opportunity to plan for an orderly
decline will enable the parties responsible for those plans to provide more
retirement security for their participants than they would have had without
that clear and inescapable warning that catastrophe was looming.
The PPA special multiemployer zone rules are set to expire (‘sunset’) at
the end of the 2014 plan year, but they will remain in effect for plans that
are in endangered or critical status at that point until they complete the
course of their recovery. The law also calls on the Departments of Treasury
and Labor and the PBGC to make a comprehensive study of the multiemployer funding rules—with particular attention to their impact on small
employers—by the end of 2011. Congress will then have three more years
to consider whether to extend the zone approach, introduce a different
funding regime for multiemployer plans, or just let the basic ERISA rules
go back into effect. (Presumably, the 2011 tri-agency funding study will be
just the start of its fact-finding and policy deliberation on this subject.)
Perhaps the most important innovation in the zone concepts is the reintroduction of risks to participants’ existing benefits when a multiemployer
pension plan starts to falter. The notion that it is appropriate for the
participants to bear some of the risk of adverse investment and other
experience, even in a DB plan, appears to have been useful to many
plans in developing their recovery path, and the possibility of going a
step further is starting to gain some currency among policy experts. Proposals for formal mechanisms for rolling back participants’ accrued benefits when a DB plan comes under severe financial stress have been floated
in various quarters, as a way to moderate employers’ financial exposure and
thus revive their interest in sponsoring DB plans (Warshawsky, 2012). The
experience of red-zone multiemployer plans, as it develops, may provide
some insights into how this kind of sacrifice affects participants’ willingness
to support the pension plan and whether it is an effective way to stabilize
pension plans in the long run.
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Endnotes
1. Four years of zone status information appears in Segal (2011a, 2011b, 2011c).
The zone surveys for all years starting with 2007 (the first of which reports on
projected zone status for 2008) are available on request through http://www.
segalco.com/publications/surveysandstudies.
2. One client, the Central States Pension Fund, is so large and so distinctive that it is
omitted from the database for the surveys to avoid distorting the results. Accordingly, its experience is not reflected in this analysis.
3. Because of client privacy commitments, we cannot identify the specific plans on
which these analyses are based.
4. In addition, many plans for salaried workers use the ‘elapsed time method’ to
determine eligibility, vesting, and accrual credit. This enables them to avoid
counting individual hours, if they credit a person with a year of service if he or
she is employed by the employer at the beginning and end of a stated twelvemonth period. As with hours-based methods, employees whose jobs change
frequently and who are likely to be working for different companies at the
beginning and end of a year can fall between the cracks under this system even
with substantial longevity in the industry.
5. To date, multiemployer plans have generally not used liability-driven investments or similar strategies to avoid potential funding volatility. One reason is
that funding rules for multiemployer plans do not require trustees to trade off
higher returns on the participants’ assets in favor of stability in funding demands. The 2006 redesign of the single-employer funding rules, with the emphasis on market-based asset and liability measures and drastically reduced role for
credit balances, sparked the current interest among corporate plan sponsors in
using investment strategy as a buffer against volatility.
6. One notable example of this occurred in late 2006, when UPS negotiated with
the Teamsters to exit the Central States Fund and cover its workers in a singleemployer plan.
7. This is called a termination by mass withdrawal. Although the law recognizes
multiemployer-plan terminations that are initiated by the trustees through plan
amendments, this rarely (if ever) happens.
8. As of December 2010, the funds in the Segal Advisors Multiemployer Universe
represented $65 billion. The average multiemployer investment allocation is 44
percent domestic equity, 25 percent fixed income, 11 percent international
equity, 5 percent real estate, and 15 percent other, such as cash or non-realestate alternatives. Typical policy constraints are 40–70 percent to equities.
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9. In prosperous times, multiemployer plans are frequently amended to provide
‘13th checks’—a one-time, ad hoc extra payment to retirees. These now must be
fully funded in the year they are paid out.
10. The relief was actually available for the first plan year beginning on and after
October 1, 2008, to include plans whose plan year began in the last quarter of
2008, which would be among the hardest hit by the market decline.
11. Although the law only prescribes tests for endangered and critical status, IRS
rules also require multiemployer plans’ actuaries to certify if the plan is not in
either category.
12. In some ways, this distinction looks more important than it turns out to be in
practice, as these seriously endangered plans usually drop into the red zone in
short order.
13. By contrast with the multiemployer guarantee levels, which can only be
changed by Congressional action, the single-employer benefit guarantees are
indexed to inflation on the same basis as Social Security benefits.
14. Officially, this is the ‘Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
and Pension Relief Act of 2010’.
15. The bill’s proponents intended to provide for a thirty-year extended amortization period, but it ended up at twenty-nine years because of an apparent
drafting error.
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